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Chapter Two

The Theological Origins ol Engineering

BRAD

J.

KALLENBERG

Knowledge of our roots can sometimes help us figure out how we
ought to proceed. Many claim that engineering began in ancient an-

tiquity with the Egyptian pyramids, Archimedes' inventions, or the
Roman aqueducts. Others give contemporary engineering a more recent history, tracing its origins to the Industrial Revolution or the Enlightenment. Yet what is often overlooked is the fact that contemporary
engineering owes part of its identity to medieval monasticism. The advantage of remembering this history is the bearing it has on the questions "What is engineering for?" and "How ought engineering be
practiced?"
Michael Davis makes the claim that, in Western thought, engineering has always played second fiddle to science because we in the West
have been bewitched by the myth that engineering is nothing but applied science. But engineering is not merely applied science. Engineering has its own distinctive identity. In the first place, Davis claims that
engineering can be distinguished from science by the sheer magnitude
of the projects undertaken. Constructing a bridge, building a dam,
raising a skyscraper are all tasks that require a great deal of cooperation, the sort of cooperation with which the lone inventor or isolated
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research scientist may have little experience. Of course, if Hobbes is
to be believed about the unstable nature of society, the only body capable of the organization and coercive leadership necessary for such
large-scale cooperation is the military. Consequently, Davis traces the
origins of modern engineering to the seventeenth century, when France
boasted an army of 300,000 foot soldiers. For the first time in European history, those foot soldiers who operated the big weapons became
organized into a special unit-the corps du genie-a term that connotes
both the "engines" of war and the "genie" or magic associated with
their function .1
Although the seventeenth-century corps members are probably
best thought of as proto-engineers, the officers of this unit (offi.cieurs
du genie) began to undergo a formal training (in mathematics, technology, and officer training) whose curriculum differs only slightly from
that of today's schools of engineering. 2 Thus what had begun as Ecole
des Travaux Public (the School of Public Works), by 1794 became
Ecole Polytechnique. This institution is still in operation and its curricula became the model for the first school of engineering in the Americas, namely, the US Military Academy at West Point.
In a moment I will explain why I think Davis's account is incomplete, if not downright wrong. Yet there is much to be said for it. Who
could disagree that warcraft was the soil in which even the smallest
technological advance blossomed with importance to the end that each
was coopted for military use? Famously, the invention of the stirrup
secured the superiority of the Frankish cavalry over their more loosely
seated opponents in the eighth century just as the development of a
better trigger enabled William the Conqueror to utilize crossbows to
overpower his Norman opponents in the eleventh. 3
Moreover, engineering has a distinctive domain of knowledge. As
is often the case, with specialization comes a sort of tunnel vision. Perhaps this helps to explain the enduring tendency of engineers to be
more enamored with "engineering as an end in itself rather than as
a means to satisfying human need." 4 On the one hand, if engineers
are descendants of military officers, then they have been trained and
bound to do as they are commanded. On the other hand, each generation of engineers is entrusted with a growing and specialized body of
knowledge the mastery of which requires successively greater and
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greater amounts of time and attention. Consequently, it is not surprising that engineers today are easily caricatured as task-oriented folk
who are more apt to keep their noses to the grindstone than to trouble
with the "why?" questions that seem to lie outside the purvey of engineering itself.
Many (and I among them) feel that the tunnel vision, which is so
stereotypical of contemporary engineering, points to a lamentable failing. If "doing one's job" does not automatically indemnify soldiers acting under orders, why should engineers be excused from making ethics
or economics or politics their business? While Davis concedes that this
tendency may appear troubling, he explains that treating engineering
as an end in itself is not identical to tunnel vision and therefore not
necessarily a bad thing (though it may be). Although engineering was
conceived and birthed by the military, he argues, it matured during the
Age of Enlightenment, a time rife with the optimism that scientific
learning in every form "would bring peace, prosperity, and continuous
improvement." 5 The conclusion Davis wants his readers to draw is that
engineers may be somewhat justified in their narrow preoccupation
with technical brilliance because the enterprise by its very nature as
an offspring of the Enlightenment cannot but serve human need and
improve society. Therefore, the concentration with which engineers
treat engineering as end in itself in lieu of attention to broader social
issues need not tarnish the image of engineering as a morally oriented
enterprise.
Davis does have a point. Engineering has an excellent track record
in the service of human need. And in large measure, this track record
functions as a gyroscope that helps engineering stay on course despite the tangential impetuses of governmental agendas and business
"needs." However, I am not convinced that this gyroscope, while absolutely necessary to the continued flourishing of technical expertise, is a
sufficient condition for engineering as a whole to maintain its moral
bearings. There is a latent ambiguity in engineering's self-understanding.
If human life is for increasing market share in a capitalist economy,
then designed obsolescence is a reasonable engineering strategy. If
human life is for protecting the security of one's people against others,
then engineering's four-hundred-year-long allegiance to the military
is entirely appropriate. The question, "What is human life for?" has
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enormous bearing on the practice of engineering. 6 Therefore, engineers
may benefit from an account of engineering history that is already
steeped in an account of what human life is for.
The story I wish to narrate takes us back to the twelfth-century
monastery of St. Victor in Paris. I will argue that what they called "mechanical arts" is a forerunner of what we today call "engineering." Central for my purposes is the Didascalicon, written in the 1120s by Hugh
of St. Victor. It not only exemplifies a theological model for understanding the identity of engineering, it has bearing on how engineering
ought to be practiced.
It is not altogether clear when in history "mechanical arts" becomes recognizable as proto-engineering or when engineers successfully shed their longstanding class stigma. The earlier one looks in
ancient history, the more disparaging is the view toward mechanical
things. Archimedes (d. 212 BCE) may have saved Athens with his contraptions, but as Plutarch explains, he did so shamefully, fully aware of
Plato's "indignation at [mechanical arts], and his invectives against it as
the mere corruption and annihilation of the one good geometry. "7 Likewise Plato's contemporary, Xenophon (d. 354 BCE) makes it clear that
no true gentleman practiced "mechanical arts." Xenophon reports Socrates' exclamation:
[N]ot only are the arts which we call mechanical [banausikai] generally held in bad repute, but States also have a very low opinion of
them,-and with justice. For they are injurious to the bodily health
of workmen and overseers, in that they compel them to be seated
and indoors, and in some cases also all day before a fire, and when
the body grows effeminate, the mind also becomes weaker and
weaker. And the mechanical arts, as they are called, will not let
men unite with them care for friends and State, so that men engaged in them must ever appear to be both bad friends and poor
defenders of their country. And there are States ... in which not a
single citizen is allowed to engage in mechanical arts [banausikas

technas ].8
Mechanical arts, in other words, were for slaves.
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But what activities fall under the domain of "mechanical arts"? As
indicated by Xenophon's words, the mechanics (banausous) spent a
large part of the day at the foundry (baunos was the forge, or furnace).
So smithing is implicated as undignified. But evidently warcraft is not.
Nor is agriculture. Socrates goes on to assert that these latter activities
are for gentlemen.
At first blush, Aristotle's three-fold division of the rational soul
into theoretical, practical, and productive reasoning holds more promise for elevating the status of manual crafts. But Aristotle (d. 322 BCE)
could not resist falling prey to the hierarchy of the disciplines that gives
wisdom (sophia) clear priority over intelligence (phronesis) and intelligence explicit reign over craftsmanship (techne-as in "technology").
To make matters worse, Aristotle also perpetuated the pejorative sense
of "mechanical" (bana.usous). So uncontestable is the slur against all
things mechanical that in the Nicomachean Ethics it is simply translated
as "vulgar"! 9 Similarly, in the Politics he writes that
any occupation, art, or science, which makes the body or soul or
mind of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of excellence, is mechanical; wherefore we call those arts mechanical
which tend to deform the body, and likewise all paid employments,
for they absorb and degrade the mind. 10

If we leap ahead eight centuries to the close of Plato's Academysimultaneous with the founding of the Order of the Benedictines in
524 CE-we will discover that among intellectuals not much has
changed. Consider Boethius (d. 524 CE), arguably the most significant
philosopher-theologian between Augustine of Hippo (d. 430 CE) and
Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274 CE). He divides the love of wisdom (philosophia.) into two disciplines only, theoretical and practical, entirely neglecting to mention productive (mechanical) arts. When Isidore of
Seville (d. 636 CE) compiles his encyclopedia a generation later, he
acknowledges a number of disciplines that lie outside the classic seven
that constitute liberal artsY
Most striking is the inclusion of mineralogy alongside the eminently reputable enterprises of medicine and agriculture. But unfortunately, Isidore did little to improve the social standing of the mechanical
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arts. His fascination with etymology led him to mistake the Latin mechanicus as derived from the Greek moichos, meaning "adulterer" rather
than from mechane (machine) and mechos (a means, something expedient, a remedy). To his credit, there is some plausibility for this
mistake. Martin of Laon (d. 680 CE) takes Isidore to mean that the
ingenuity of a mechanism was akin to the secret doings of an illicit
sexual affair:
from "moechus" we call "mechanical art" any object which is
clever and most delicate and which, in its making or operation, is
beyond detection, so that beholders find their power stolen from
them when they cannot penetrate the ingenuity of the thing. 12
But of course Isidore's genealogy could not help but accentuate the
stigma that afflicted artisans and remind them of their proper place
at the bottom of the feeding chain. Perhaps this stigma explains why
the Cistercian Order (founded 1098 CE) explicitly forbade "profane"
learning and aimed to "make of every monastery a 'school of charity'
only." 13 Human life was for the love of God and neighbor, but evidently
mechanical arts lay outside the pale of such love.
The situation would change in the twelfth century. Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1142 CE) presents the first cogent challenge to the mechinists'
stigma by offering a theological account of the practice of mechanical
arts. Granted, Hugh's account was not without rivals: his contemporary, William of Conches (d. 1154 CE), disdained the mechanical arts
as merely menial. 14 The difference between Hugh and William lay in
their starting points. While William began anthropologically with
human knowledge (scientia), Hugh began theologically with the doctrine of "sin."
The ancient Greeks explained evil in the world as the residual effect of an eternal battle between the powers of good and evil. Evil was
not only conceived as a something, it was an eternal something. Thus,
in the beginning was chaos. But Augustine, writing a millennium after
Homer and clearly Hugh's hero, could not dignify evil with substance,
much less with eternality, for as scripture spelled out, "in the beginning, God .... " In other words, in order to affirm monotheism, Augus-
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tine was bound to describe evil as having a temporal beginning. And,
in order to avoid the conclusion that God created evil, Augustine insisted evil wasn't a substance, but an absence; evil was a defect that
entered the picture some time after God had created an entirely good
world.
Whence evil? Evil was a distortion in the order of creation effected
by a misuse of creaturely freedom. How so? In order for creation to be
a uni-verse (rather than a multi-verse), creation embodied a single
hierarchy of value. 15 The human soul operates correctly when it ascribes that quality of love appropriate to the object in light of its place
on the hierarchy. Augustine (following Plato) considered the order itself every bit as real as the tangible objects that populated the hierarchy
of the created world. Evil entered when human beings re-ranked the
hierarchy of creation, ascribing an inordinate quantity oflove to one or
more of the rungs of the hierarchy. In the Apostle Paul's words, "For
they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served
the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. "16 In essence, human mis-valuing was a distortion of the order of creation. The
change was very real, although it was a distortion they bore within
themselves , for a disordered love is a disordered soul. Thus, disordered
human love manifests itself sometimes as greed, other times as jealousy, covetousness, pride, and so on. This condition had the unpleasant consequence of being perpetual, because one could only make
moral progress if one possessed a faculty for indexing the progress
made. And it was this very faculty, namely love of the Good, that could
not be trusted.
But the bad news does not stop with human depravity. Once human
beings, viceroys of creation, became incapable of rescuing themselves
(non posse non peccare, not able not to sin), the creation they were supposed to tend fell under a curse. Christian scripture aptly expresses its
undeniable reality:
For the anxious longing of the creation waits eagerly for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to futility ...
in hope that the creation itself also will be set free from its slavery
to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God.
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For we know that the whole creation groans and suffers the pains
of childbirth together until now. 17
Whether we call this curse "sin" or "entropy" makes little difference for my argument. The fact of the matter is: iron rusts, people
sicken and die, and things fall apart.
This then is the theological view of human existence that Hugh
inherits from Augustine. As fallen creatures, human beings have forgotten who they are and whose they are. Nevertheless, Hugh writes,
"we are restored through instruction, so that we may recognize our
nature." 18 God in his redemptive grace and wisdom has intended the
very condition of human fallenness as the impetus for human pursuit
of Wisdom, a quest which is the "highest curative in life."
And so arose the pursuit of that Wisdom we are required to seeka pursuit called "philosophy"-so that knowledge of truth might
enlighten our ignorance, so that love of virtue might do away with
wicked desire, and so that the quest for necessary conveniences
might alleviate our weaknesses. These three pursuits first comprised philosophy. The one which sought truth was called theoretical; the one which furthered virtue men were pleased to call
ethics; the one devised to seek conveniences custom called mechanical. 19
In this passage Hugh asserts that the redemption of the soul is assisted by the practice of "arts" that correspond with all the powers of
the soul. Corresponding to the understanding (intelligentia) are both
the theoretical arts (that is, the contemplation of necessary truths; here
Hugh intends theology, physics, and mathematics) and the practical
arts (namely, the practice of morality and the cultivation of virtue).
Corresponding to knowledge (scientia) are all the mechanical arts.
These latter have to do with feeding, fortifying the body against harm,
and the contrivance of "remedies" for alleviating physical weakness
(1.8, p. 55).
Hugh's account is a "nouveau explicitement," a brand new way of
thinking. 20 By paying more attention to the doctrine of the human fall
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into sin, Hugh is able to move beyond his forebears (such as Boethius)
and include mechanical arts under God's plan of redemption. Mechanical arts have to do with countering the effects of the curse, just as
theoretical and practical arts have to do with countering the effects of
human depravity, through the knowing and following of a gracious
God on a redemptive path.
Hugh's inclusion of the mechanical rts is no small feat, for "mechanical arts" by his day had evolved into a very broad category. To be
specific, mechanical arts was comprised of seven classes of practices:
fabric-making, armament, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medicine,
and theatricsY These seven name families of practices. For example,
"hunting ... includes all the duties of bakers, butcher, cooks, and tavern keepers," as well as those who actually do the gaming, fowling and
fishing (II.25, pp. 77-78). And "armament" included material science,
even metallurgy: "To this science belong all such materials as stones,
woods, metals, sands, and clays" (11.22, p. 76). With this last move
Hugh has managed to embrace even the grimy-faced smithy so consistently maligned for sixteen centuries.
Though fiercely loyal to Augustinian theology, Hugh parts company with Augustine's Platonic division of human arts into physics,
ethics, and logic, opting instead for Aristotle's quaternary of theoretical,
practical, productive, and logical disciplines. Under Hugh's hand, "productive" arts expands to include all mechanical arts known to him and
"logic" alone becomes the special domain of philosophy that governs
the consistency within each art and between all the arts.
Hugh argues that, as a theologically legitimate enterprise, mechanical arts were governed by logic every bit as much as were theoretical and practical arts. This means that mechanical arts can be
evaluated for how well they aimed at the human Good. Since Hugh
could not conceive of any human Good other than that revealed by the
divine Wisdom, all of the mechanical arts aim at redemptive love. To
cite one example of this redemptive vision at work, Hugh asserts "commerce" as the mechanical art that aims at reconciliation of strangers:
"The pursuit of commerce reconciles nations, calms wars, strengthens
peace, and commutes the private good of individuals into the common
benefit of all" (II.23, p.77).
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In Hugh's mind theology and mechanical arts are mutually supportive. The ends of mechanical arts are displayed by the physical
things contrived by the artificer. As these ends are theological in nature
(they aim at the Good revealed by God), mechanical arts benefit theology by rendering visible invisible things. A bridge is not merely a convenience, it is also a means of cultivating friendship between rival
villages on opposing banks. Theology in turn benefits mechanical arts
by providing a benchmark for assessing the aptness of its aims. But
Hugh is quick to caution against mistaking worldly theology (a theology that moves from human experience to the knowledge of God) for
graced theology (a theology that moves from knowledge of God to
human experience). In his Exposition of the Heavenly Hierarchy, Hugh
writes:
Invisible things can only be made known by visible things , and
therefore the whole of theology must use visible demonstrations.
But worldly theology adopted the works of creation and the elements of this world that it might make its demonstration in
these .. . . And for this reason, namely, because it used a demonstration which revealed little, it lacked ability to bring forth the
incomprehensible truth without stain of error.... In this were the
wise men of this world fools, namely, that proceeding by natural
evidences alone and following the elements and appearances of the
world, they lacked the lessons of grace. 22
What are these lessons of grace? For Hugh grace is not something
added on top of nature, but something that permeates the world and
with which human beings may keep step. "Grace," writes Hugh, is the
powerful medicine perpetually offered by God "to illuminate the blind
and to cure the weak; to illuminate ignorance, to cool concupiscence;
to illuminate unto knowledge of truth; to inflame unto love of virtue. "23 ln contrast, worldly theology is like tugging at one's bootstraps.
It reveals little, and therefore has little to say to mechanical arts, precisely because it ignores God at the outset. Worldly theology begins
with an empirical study of "pure nature" and then attempts to reason
up toward the possible existence of a divine realm. But graced theology
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unblinkingly assumes that creation is already shot through with the
presence of God. Wherever one points is God's world. Human beings
live as creatures under a creator whose divine wisdom is the archetypal
exemplar of creation. 24 Granted, evil happens. But the undeniable fact
of evil only serves to corroborate strongly the biblical story that human
beings are fallen creatures inhabiting a cursed world. The Fall and its
effects are universal in scope (how could it be otherwise?). Nevertheless, even in their fallenness, human beings are redeemable in the
pursuit of divine wisdom by means of exercising theoretical, practical,
and mechanical arts. The final end of mechanical arts is reunion with
God through the pursuit of divine wisdom as well as the alleviation of
physical weakness stemming from the cursedness of the created world.
Three conclusions can be drawn from Hugh's Didascalicon. First,
in Hugh's day the growth of technology was already noticeable enough
to require a fresh classification long before the seventeenth century that
figures so prominently in Davis's story of the identity of modern engineering. 25 Second, Hugh's account shows that despite our penchant for
separating engineering and theology, a theological account of the mechanical arts was possible. This is not to say his account is more persuasive than Davis's, only that engineering need not be excluded from
a theological account of human life.
The third conclusion to draw from the Didascalion is that, for a
careful thinker such as Hugh, a theological account was the only account that was broad enough to encompass all he had learned from
Plato (especially the Timaeus), Aristotle, Augustine, Boethius, Varro,
Quintilian, Isidore, and others. His strategy was to absorb all the pertinent sources into a master theological narrative. We moderns tend to
be suspicious of such a methodology. We are more accustomed to reconciling diverse views (if they can be reconciled at all-and it has become increasingly in vogue to assume an incommensurable plurality of
views) by reducing all the views to their greatest common denominator. Of course such a reductive methodology means that those tenets
distinctive to specific religions such as Christianity or Islam or Judaism
must be surrendered in the name of peaceful coexistence with its rivals.
But then what is left? The greatest common denominator, it would be
argued five centuries later, was the notion of "pure nature." However,
this notion was simply not available to Hugh for two reasons.
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In the first place, as Henri de Lubac has convincingly argued, the
perspective of present-day historiographers may be blurred by three
hundred years of (Cartesian) dualism that wrongheadedly presupposes
it even makes sense to speak of "pure nature." In this thoroughly secularized vision, notions of "grace," "spirit," "calling," and the "supernatural"-if they have substantive content at all-are concluded to be
mere add-ons to a presumably more basic concept: "pure nature." But
this could not have been the Christian outlook in its previous fifteen
centuries. The creation of human beings in God's image had sweeping
ramifications for understanding for what human life was intended. Medieval Christians simply took it for granted that human beings were
"destined to live eternally in God, to enter into the inner movement of
the Trinitarian life and to bring all creation with [them]." 26 In other
words, for medieval believers , "nature was made for the supernatural"
and cannot even be conceived, much less explained, without itY The
inseparability of natural and supernatural typified the medieval Christianity and is given its most eloquent expression by Augustine who
included all creation in the "us" of the famous opening to his Confessions: "You have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it
rests in you."
In the second place, until late in the seventeenth century, "natural
philosophy" covered much of the same domain as "Christian theology." It is a colossal misunderstanding to think natural philosophy
studied "pure nature" while Christian theology studied a putative "supernatural" realm. On the contrary, both disciplines were overlapping
responses to the created world (and it was seen as creation, rather than
something else). 28 Historian of science Margaret Osler writes,
Medieval natural philosophy was conditioned by theological presuppositions, and its conclusions pertained to important theological issues. Discussions of the causes of things , for example,
included questions about the cause of the world and revolved
around the issues of the divine creation of the world. Discussions
of matter and change had implications for the interpretation of the
Eucharist. Discussions of the nature of animals and how they differ
from humans had direct bearing on questions about the ilnmortality of the human souP9
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Osler's words point to the fact that medievals could not separate
efficient and material causes from final causes in their explanations.
Christian theology and natural philosophy had overlapping domains
because in a created world both disciplines had the same final cause
(namely; union with the creator God). It is only after the Enlightenment project abandons Aristotle that subsequent moderns are tempted
to read mere instrumentalism-efficient causes taken in isolation from
final causes-back into medieval thought. 30
Perhaps an example can make this clearer. The requirement that
monks devote themselves to work is widely acknowledged. What is
contested today is whether the Benedictine motto, "work is prayer"
(!abo rare est orare), originally reflected a sacramental rather than an
instrumental view of work. For his part, historian jacques Le Goff
maintains that monks worked hard, intentionally trying to improve
their efficiency with machinery (such as the water-powered mill constructed at Saint Ursus at Loches in the sixth century) so as to free up
time for the essential thing: opus Dei, namely contemplative prayer. 31 In
other words, Le Goff can see water mills for saving time but not for
worship. Does Le Goff get history wrong?
Le Goff's history is not so much wrong as it is monochromatic.
Did water mills save time? Of course. But where Le Goff sees in black
and white, Hugh sees in resplendent color. For Hugh, mechanical arts
yielded artifacts (and processes) that were inherently sacramental because they rendered visible the end of mechanical reasoning, which
in its exercise was simultaneously natural (namely, the alleviation of
physical weakness) and supernatural (namely, the journeying toward
reunion with divine wisdom).
The strength of Hugh's theological account is that it supplies what
nontheological (what Hugh called "worldly") accounts could not as
easily do, namely, thick description of the final end toward which all
human activity aims. In sum, it was by the "lessons of grace" that Hugh
was able to see the physical world under both the aspect of the supernatural and the aspect of the natural. Accordingly he described mechanical arts as guided by a dual encl. The supervening supernatural
end is this: the exercise of mechanical reasoning is part of the journey
toward reunion with God. The subvening natural end is this: mechanical artifacts are for the alleviation of physical weakness that is the consequence of living in a fallen world.
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